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Abstract    
This article examines attempts by professionals in the Danish branch of the 
environmental NGO NatureAid to optimize their practice by developing a local 
standard. Describing these efforts as an experiment in optimization, we outline a post-
critical alternative to critiques that centre on the reductive effects of management and 
audit. The notion that reduction is inherently negative fails to recognize that achieving 
specific forms of reduction is often the reflexive aim of standardization. Rather than 
resisting monitoring and evaluation, the environmental consultants we study try to 
create a system capable of constraining their work in the right way. 
 Focusing on this experiment in optimization allows us to redescribe audit as a 
varied set of practices and aspirations, embedded in standards that generate relative, 
forms of organizational transparency and opacity. This offers a view of management 
as ‘broken up;’ as a distributed, ambient activity, variably performed by different 
actors using different standards.  
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Introduction 
Western societies increasingly document just about any activity – from children’s 
reading abilities, to patterns of consumption and the accomplishments of 
organizations – and render them subject to evaluation. According to the sociologist 
and management scholar Michael Power, by the mid-1990s evaluations were so 
widespread that one could speak of an audit explosion (Power 1994, 1997; Jensen and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This paper is a modified version of Winthereik and Jensen (2014), originally published in Danish. 	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Winthereik 2013, 121-147). Power further argued that evaluations gradually gained a 
legitimizing, or even ritual, function in modern societies. To a significant extent, they 
came to be conducted for their own sake. The consequence was that the assumed link 
between evaluation, quality improvement and optimization was often tenuous, if not 
altogether missing. Often, Power argued, evaluation resulted in little but new forms of 
‘learned ignorance’ (Power 1997, 123).  
In this paper, we focus on optimization efforts in the Danish office of the 
international NGO NatureAid.2 Because NatureAid is concerned with changing socio-
environmental conditions in developing countries, this is a place where the concerns 
of critical management studies with the negative consequences of standardization and 
optimization intersects with the critique of international development formulated by 
the anthropology of development. Focusing on standardization as an experimental 
practice, we offer a description of audit not as a system of domination but as a set of 
varied practices, the interaction of which create relative transparencies and opacities. 
Generating an image of organizational responsibilities as distributed, ambient and 
variably performed, this post-critical perspective (see also Jensen and Winthereik 
2012, Yarrow and Venkatesan 2012) also indicates one-way in which management 
might be said to have broken up. 
 
Critiques of Management, Standardization, and Development 
Michael Power developed his critique of audit in the aftermath of the wave of New 
Public Management (NPM) initiatives, which massively influenced the management 
of public institutions in the 1990s. Not least, New Public Management became (in-
)famous for its effort to optimize such institutions. The threat of rising public 
expenses had to be curtailed without citizens, now redefined as customers (du Gay 
and Salaman 1992) experiencing decreases in service. Creating transparency was 
meant to identify superfluous modes of operation and to support streamlining of the 
entire sector. Thus, the implementation of new forms of documentation was central to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  We conducted this fieldwork in 2011-12 as part of a more comprehensive study of 
partnership, infrastructures and monitoring in development aid (Jensen and Winthereik 2013).  
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these reforms. Across the board, organizations introduced new monitoring 
technologies, rendering an ever-broadening array of activities amenable to audit.  
 In a general sense, New Public Management followed the long shadow cast by 
Frederick Taylor, whose time-motion studies had been the crucial technique of early 
industrial optimization. NPM deployed a more differentiated set of techniques, yet it 
remained congenially fascinated with determining the optimal way for organizations 
to work (Tolsby 2000). Moreover, NPM also followed the Taylorist division of 
labour, according to which it was up to managers to identify the optimal modus 
operandi, while it was the task of employers to practically execute it.  
 One of the most enduring social scientific critiques of audit is that monitoring 
and evaluation systems are reductive. Only able to measure what they were designed 
to do, these systems are inherently narrow and inflexible, and so incapable of making 
visible anything different, new, or surprising. Hence, the audit systems that surround 
us have the primary effect of simplifying a complex reality. Countering these 
reductive effects, social scientists position themselves as watchdogs, vigilant voices 
speaking truth to power (e.g. Shore and Wright 2015).  
 Broadly similar critiques were developed within the anthropology of 
development. Drawing on Michel Foucault, James Ferguson’s (1990) path-breaking 
study described international development as a machine for turning political problems 
into technical fixes. Ferguson described his own endeavour as diagnostic, but many 
subsequent studies were explicitly critical. These include Arturo Escobar’s (1995) 
Encountering Development, which inspired a series of ‘post-development’ studies 
(e.g. Rahnema and Bawtree 1997), all of which centred on critiquing the power 
dynamics inherent in any development effort. 
From ethnographic locations in developing countries, situated amongst those 
development programs intended to ‘develop,’ anthropologists had rich opportunities 
for documenting the deployment of reductive plans and projects that made little local 
sense, and often led to harmful consequences. Yet, this position also made it easy to 
depict development professionals as ‘others;’ at once powerful and ignorant. Indeed, 
Ferguson (1997, 165) described such depictions as an ‘anthropological specialty.’  
Our position amongst NatureAid professionals made this view of development 
professionals untenable. We began from an office in Copenhagen, which functioned 
as our central field site, and had only occasional opportunity to travel with our 
informants to their “field sites,” in other countries. Elsewhere (Jensen and Winthereik 
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2013), we have described our approach as an inverse development anthropology, 
since, compared with the critical anthropology of development, which is usually 
premised on fieldwork located in places we only briefly visited, the sequence and the 
direction of the ethnography was reversed. Our point, however, is not analytical 
reversal aiming to vindicate development against its critics. Instead, we are interested 
in further differentiating it as a series of variegated practices (Venkatesan and Yarrow 
2012). In this paper, we do so by outlining a post-critical alternative to monitoring 
and standardization.   
Among other things, alternative hinges on the relation between performativity 
as exhibited in organizational optimization efforts and the performativity of social 
science. To situate the argument, we therefore briefly outline the key differences 
between our approach and some recent interpretations of performativity in the critical 
management literature.   
 
Performativity and Organisational Experimentation 
In The Postmodern Condition (1984), the philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard argued 
that in the age of information ‘proofs’ had become performative. ‘The technical 
criterion, introduced on a massive scale into scientific knowledge,’ he wrote, ‘cannot 
fail to influence the truth criterion’ (1984, 46). Among other things, technical 
evaluations were becoming self-referential. As Michael Power would later argue, one 
consequence was a generally diminishing ability of evaluations to produce substantial 
knowledge. This decline correlated with an increasing capacity for producing self-
affirming kinds of information. In more general terms, what was described was a 
collapse of content into form. Anthropologists of audit and standardization drew 
broadly similar conclusions. For example, Peter Pels argued that audit ‘actively 
constructs the environments in which it operates, making it more “auditable” at the 
same time that it renders itself thereby invulnerable to its own failure’ (2000, 142, 
referring to Power (1994, 7-8)). 
 Within management studies, some critical scholars have focused on the fact 
that performativity, in Lyotard’s sense, made knowledge part of ‘means-ends 
calculations’ (Fournier and Grey 2000, 17). To counter this tendency, they promoted 
an ‘anti-performative’ approach, critical of deploying instrumental reason in service 
of economic efficiency. Countering this approach, André Spicer et al (2009, 538) 
argued instead for ‘critical performativity,’ defined as the ‘active and subversive 
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intervention into managerial discourses and practices.’ Aiming to move beyond the 
‘cynicism that pervades CMS [critical management studies],’ this approach would 
remain critical by ‘radically questioning widely accepted assumptions’ while also 
remaining performative by opening ‘up new ways of understanding and engaging 
with the discourse with the ambition to have some effects on practice’ (Alvesson and 
Spicer 2012, 376). Critical performativity thus assumes the possibility of directing 
performativity away from economic efficiency and instrumental reason and towards 
worthwhile socio-political aims.  
 This position, however, has also come in for critique. Radical aspirations 
aside, some have characterized it as offering a benign form of managerialism. Others 
have argued that it embeds overly ‘optimistic assumptions about the power of 
language to change certain structural realities as well as the capabilities of CMS 
scholars to perform emancipatory change through discourse and micro-level 
engagement’ (Fleming and Banerjee 2016, 263).  
 Yet others pointed to a more general problem with the understanding of 
performativity. Thus, Cabantous et al (2016, 201) followed Judith Butler (e.g. 2010) 
in arguing that one cannot make discourses more or less performative because 
performativity is a general condition of discourse. Spicer et al (2016) vigorously 
resisted this critique, depicting it as an ivory-tower preoccupation with the purity of 
theoretical definitions. 
 Even so, the critique stands. If, as has been convincingly demonstrated (e.g. 
Cooren 2010, Derrida 1988, Fish 1989), performativity is a condition of discourse, it 
is not a matter of volition. Integral to processes of material transformation (e.g. Callon 
2010, Jensen 2005, Pickering 1995), one cannot, similarly, elect to be materially 
performative (Jensen 2007). Whether operating through discourse, materiality, or 
mixtures of the two, there is no way of ensuring a match between intention and 
performative outcome. Accordingly, the firm declaration of performative intent makes 
one neither more nor less performative than those who with equal determination argue 
against performativity. Everyone is, performatively speaking, in the same boat. 
 This insight is basic to our argument that optimization in NatureAid must be 
understood in a post-critical register. Since inability to dictate (performative) 
outcomes is a general organizational and analytical condition, the question of how to 
develop an improved standard within NatureAid, which hold our attention in the 
following, gains an experimental dimension. 
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In fact, an emphasis on experiments unfolding in practice is deeply embedded 
within science and technology studies. Thus, studies have demonstrated the multiple 
and variable consequences of standards and classifications (e.g. Almklov 2008; 
Bowker and Star 2000, Jensen 2010, Zuiderent-Jerak 2015). Doing so, they 
challenged the idea that technologies of optimization, like the monitoring and 
evaluation tools that hold our interest below, are simply ’technologies of control.’ 
Rather than assuming the efficacy of such technologies -- with the consequence that 
the relevant scholarly response is always to “critique” or “radically question” them – 
these studies have demonstrated that the introduction of technologies and techniques 
tend to introduce new margins of indeterminacy and unpredictability, and that they 
often generate unforeseen practical and material effects. Along these lines, we view 
discussions about a new monitoring and evaluation system in NatureAid as an 
experiment in optimization.  
In our view, the emphasis on ‘experiments in’ rather than ‘tools for’ 
optimization is important in different ways. First, it sheds a different light on activities 
often rendered by critical management theory as forms of resistance. Rather than 
critiquing optimization in toto, viewing it as empirical forms of organizational 
experimentation makes it possible to distinguish between different forms and 
consequences. While some forms of optimization may indeed be resisted, responses 
may also include testing the capacity of standards to lead to improvements, making 
different monitoring and evaluation tools, or attempting to redefine what counts as 
optimal. In the following, we explore such forms of experimental optimization in the 
Copenhagen office of NatureAid. 
 
Terms of Reference 
Our fieldwork at NatureAid explored the role of monitoring and evaluation standards 
in establishing partnership relations in development aid. Shortly before our arrival, the 
Danish office had received a large grant from Danida, the Danish development 
agency. Because of the substantial amount of money involved, the development aid 
team within NatureAid was particularly attentive to Danida’s requirements for 
transparency. This attention was further amplified, since these requirements were 
different from those of the private funders with whom they already worked. On top of 
these demands, the office had to live up to the audit requirements of NatureAid’s own 
headquarters. 
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 Within this general context, we were able to study a variety of standards: bi-
annual and annual reports, the so-called ‘evaluation wheel’ used by the international 
headquarter, and different documents required by Danida and private donors. We also 
observed employees during their daily work, and we conducted unplanned and 
structured interviews with employees at different organisational levels. Finally, Brit 
joined a 12-day visit to monitor an ecotourism project in Vietnam, carried out in 
partnership with the organization’s Hanoi office (Jensen and Winthereik 2015).   
 Within the office, monitoring and evaluation practices were quite hard to pin 
down. As a set of activities that often blended into other kinds of work, such as 
reflecting on competences, capacities and outcomes, monitoring and evaluation had in 
some sense become ‘second nature’ for the team members.  At the same time, 
however, almost every meeting generated lively discussion about the quality of the 
standards used for audit. Rather than focusing on a particular ‘project’ that aimed to 
improve audit, we try in the following to capture a sense of its organizational 
ambience. 
Our ability to engage with a small team of environmental consultants was the 
outcome of a half-year of preliminary negotiations with management at the 
Copenhagen office. At the end of this lengthy process, we had been requested to 
formulate a so-called TOR, a Terms of Reference, describing how our study would 
contribute to the monitoring and evaluation efforts taking place in the NGO. Directed 
to the board, the final TOR stated that we would evaluate organizational efforts to 
evaluate, and that we would share our analyses in two workshops. Whereas our own 
interest was ethnographic and analytical, its pursuance was thus made possible by 
promises to contribute to internal organizational learning. One might therefore say 
that our research ended up somewhere in-between analyses of and for organizations 
(Jensen and Winthereik 2013, 31-51; Neyland 2008), and thus also subject to the 
accusation of ‘benign managerialism’ mentioned above. For reasons discussed below, 
however, we find this kind of critique to be rather beside the point.  
In some ways our position was comparable to the position in which the 
evaluators that we studied found themselves. Like the conditions that framed our 
study hinged on negotiations across the NGO, and similar to the way in which our 
acceptance also depended on a mixed set of expectations, the environmental 
consultants were also negotiating their terms of reference across a number of different 
locations and with varied stakeholders.     
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Saving the World with Reports 
NatureAid is located in one of Copenhagen’s shabbier neighbourhoods. Once per 
week we travelled there by bus or bike to conduct fieldwork. Over a period of nine 
months we did participant observation, joined meetings and conducted in situ 
interviews with a view to understanding organizational practices of monitoring and 
evaluation. Often, we would ‘shadow’ a member of the ‘development team’ (Danish: 
U-landsteamet). This team consisted of four consultants who we call Eric, Magnus, 
Kirsten and Hanne. While Danida sponsored most activities in this period, the team 
referred directly to the local branch manager, a well-known figure who often 
comments on environmental issues in the Danish media. Due to Danida’s focus on 
poverty reduction, the team was involved in both environmental conservation and 
development.  
 Nature Aid, we were told, is a ‘knowledge organization.’ This meant that the 
local branches are involved in creating knowledge about different aspects of 
environmental hazards, which is disseminated through the NatureAid network. As a 
knowledge organization, the design and implementation of projects, as well as 
lobbying and advocacy, all had to be based on a ‘solid, preferably evidence-based’ 
foundation (interview Eric, NatureAid 2010). Though the international NatureAid 
headquarter employs its own scientists to create this foundation, it also relies heavily 
on external consultants, commissioned to research certain topics and areas, with a 
view to subsequent development of benchmarks for monitoring and evaluation.  
These forms of evidence were used by team members in order to lobby large 
corporations. For example, they might present expert evidence on the harmful 
consequences of palm oil production in order to convince supermarket chains to buy 
more environmentally friendly products. Team members also used the knowledge 
base to identify sites of suspect activity, like illegal logging, in their partner countries. 
Joining consultants in these countries on field trips, they aim to liaise with local 
people in order to raise awareness of environmental issues and, ideally, develop 
shared responses.   
In general, people working for NatureAid were very busy handling their 
project portfolios, applying for funds, lobbying, travelling, budgeting -- and 
monitoring. They typically had too little time, and too much to do. Unhappiness with 
the available information and the urge to change the situation certainly also played a 
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role in the decision to let us study their work. At the time of our arrival, a sense that 
the numerous incongruent documentation requirements of headquarters and the 
various donors could be handled more effectively, and the feeling that current 
monitoring and evaluation efforts did not lead to any noticeable in-house learning, 
had led to the idea of developing a new standard, or, rather, re-inventing an old one.  
In an interview with the branch manager, we learned that monitoring and 
evaluation of the overall NatureAid network is based on Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs). Yet team members observed that the network KPIs did not produce 
information relevant to the variety of funders to whom they had to report. Moreover, 
they complained that the KPIs were useless for local processes of learning and 
reflection. What they sought was information they could turn into practically useful 
knowledge.  
 To understand the following discussions around standards for monitoring and 
evaluation in NatureAid it is relevant to note that the professionals in the development 
team were all, in different ways, out to ’save the world.’ Several interviews 
highlighted the idea of ‘making a difference’ as a crucial motivation for working in 
the NGO. For example, Magnus told us that he cherished his organization’s role as 
‘watchdog.’ Contrary to Danida, which cannot avoid being entangled in ‘all sorts of 
political agendas,’ he felt that he was able to speak freely, thus ‘raising the bar’ of 
expectations (interview Magnus, NatureAid 2010).  
Yet, in spite of hard work and good intentions, it was often difficult for team 
members to know whether the projects they ran had really changed anything for the 
better. Hence the strong interest in figuring out how their efforts might be optimized. 
 The employees took the obligatory monitoring and evaluation quite seriously. 
The reports were obligatory in any case, but the team also assumed that they did 
contribute to understanding aid efficiency at an aggregate level. At the same time, 
however, these efforts were largely seen as something one needed to get over with. 
Since the evaluations were meant for consumption and use in Danida or in NatureAid 
headquarters, they were not considered of much use locally.  
However, this did not mean that monitoring was perceived as irrelevant in 
general. Hanne from the development aid team explained the situation as follows: 
 
To a significant degree we are monitoring for ourselves. If we only monitored 
in order to be on good terms with Danida, then we wouldn’t… those 5 page 
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status reports about something you have worked with for many years, it can 
easily be done while also focusing on other tasks. So we do it for our own 
sake. Because we would like to make some super cool projects. I really want 
to make a difference (Interview NatureAid, 2011)  
 
However, rather than the content of submitted reports, Hanne and others insisted that 
what mattered was shared reflections prior to or following the submissions. In turn, 
the importance of these discussions faded in comparison with the continuous informal 
work to make and maintain relations between team members, and with project 
partners in other countries. Thus, Hanne explained: 
 
I am not getting information about how a project is running through 
standardized formats. It doesn’t happen when I receive my progress report. It 
happens through on-going dialogue and through project visits. The reports are 
fine as a backup, but these standards that tell you things are going like this and 
this with regards to input 1, no. What is substantial is where you get 
knowledge about what you actually are trying to accomplish, using taxpayers’ 
money. What kind of difference are we trying to make? I don’t get that from 
the documents but from other sources (Interview NatureAid, 2011) 
 
Whereas ’standardized formats’ were thus used to demonstrate the importance of 
projects to others, the knowledge relevant to Hanne and her colleagues had other 
sources, as well as other means of distribution. 
   
The ‘Evaluation Wheel’ 
During a mail correspondence, Hanne sent us a number of non-mandatory guidelines 
for improving monitoring and evaluation circulated by NatureAid headquarters. 
Among these were an ‘evaluation wheel’ which, depicting projects as ‘cycles,’ 
covered everything from the first project description to the final evaluation. In the 
image of the wheel, initial project plans and project outcomes would be joined 
together. If they didn’t, one could embark on another round of evaluation. Among 
many other things, the wheel requested information about ‘general practice and 
assumptions,’ ‘definitions,’ ‘design,’ ‘implementation,’ ‘analysis and adjustment,’ 
	   11	  
and ‘sharing.’ The wheel would also elicit information about how to ‘give and receive 
feedback, conduct evaluations and audits, and promote a culture of learning.’  
To promote a culture of learning, this standard both loosened and went 
considerably beyond the KPIs, encouraging informal exchanges over e-mail and 
telephone, and emphasizing that learning is a two-way process. Thus, the evaluation 
wheel testified to the organizational co-existence of formal, quantitative monitoring 
and evaluation and qualitative, process-oriented and narrative methods. Indeed, we 
are in the vicinity of a view of knowledge making not radically different from what 
one encounters in qualitative sociology, socio-cultural anthropology, or critical 
management studies. Highlighting the important of informal communication, for 
example, the standard aligns with social scientific analyses, which have focused on 
nurturing communities of practice (Lave and Wenger (1991), see also Vann and 
Bowker (2001)).  
In principle, the evaluation wheel offered an excellent tool for eliciting and 
sharing information about projects and results. We initially assumed that it would be 
important for the team, not least because it encouraged the simultaneous use of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. In reality, though, we never saw the standard 
used, or even mentioned, other than in the email conversation and in an interview 
with the branch manager about the KPIs. 
Eventually we asked Kirsten whether and how the international standards 
were used in daily work. In response, she flatly denied any practical utility. 
‘Fundamentally,’ she replied, ‘those standards are far too general and unspecific. 
There is no relation between their demands and what it makes sense for us to 
evaluate.’ Possibly, the standard was good at measuring certain things, but they were 
not the kinds of things she wanted to know: 
 
They can be used to collect experiences about what can be measured. An 
increase in rhinos. They are of no use in showing us changed patterns of 
activity among those who cause the problems for the natural resources. 
(Interview NatureAid, 2011)  
 
What Kirsten opposed was not the ambition embedded in the evaluation wheel to 
integrate qualitative and quantitative understandings, but rather the conservationist 
logic underlying both the KPIs and the wheel. While good at counting rhinos, for 
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example, the wheel provided no tools for understanding changes in peoples’ 
orientations to their environments. Nor did it generate information about the relation 
between environmental protection and poverty reduction, central to NatureAid’s 
portfolio of projects funded by Danida. Indeed, Kirsten repeatedly contrasted the 
broad vision of the local branch compared with the narrow emphasis on conservation 
promoted by headquarters. 
In her view, the evaluation wheel was simultaneously too detailed, as it 
required team members to spend time making many irrelevant things visible, and 
useless for capturing the aspects of complex project realities that truly mattered. 
Rather than opening up for discussions about the difficulties of balancing 
conservation and development work, the wheel muted these conversations. 
This dissatisfaction was generally shared within the team. During our 
fieldwork, it led to a group decision to try to reintroduce a set of internal evaluation 
tools, which had been lost from organizational memory in connection with cutbacks 
and lay-offs a few years earlier. In Kirsten’s view, remaking this standard would help 
the team to ‘evaluate the relevance, use value, and sustainability of development 
work.’ This, she thought, marked a fundamental difference from the kinds of 
monitoring and evaluation required by external stakeholders.  
Minimalism was central to the plans for reinventing the homemade standard. 
In stark contrast with the proposal for comprehensive documentation outlined in 
evaluation wheel, the initial idea centred on a brief two-page list containing open-
ended questions about project progress.3 Rather than requiring individual responses, 
the team would simply meet on a regular basis to discuss the particular questions that 
made most sense at the time. The local standard would institutionalize ‘informal 
feedback,’ as recommended by the international standard, but it would do so without 
adding extra layers of documentation and bureaucracy. Kirsten, one of the few 
employees who had worked in NatureAid when the system was last used, described 
its advantages as follows:  
 
It was a good system because it created communication. It forced us to 
formulate some clear goals, and to collaborate across projects. It created a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See Mol and Law (2002: 13-14) on lists and complex knowledge.	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good working environment, and there was a real urge to discuss. It was a 
happy period (Interview NatureAid, 2011) 
 
The discussions around re-inventing the standard revolved around how to create a 
shared room for discussions of content and work progress. Similar to Teun Zuiderent-
Jerak’s (2015) argument that standardization is itself a situated practice, the 
homemade standard can be seen as an outcome of the differing perspectives of what 
constitutes work optimization held by differently situated managers and consultants. 
Kept deliberately vague to give new kinds of communication a chance to emerge, the 
consultants agreed that the new standard should not be a tool to ‘bridge the gap’ 
between managers and practitioners, but a tool to optimize their day-to-day operations 
at the office and in the field. It was a solution to a transparency problem that was 
opaque to the gaze of the managers – locally as well as at headquarters.  	  
Critical Potentials 
Above we have described discussions unfolding among the team about the shape of a 
new monitoring and evaluation system meant to be locally meaningful.4 Given the 
packed schedules of the consultants, it was far from obvious that their limited time 
should be spent debating the form of yet another standard. Yet, they described 
alternative evaluation procedures, and went on to try to convince management that 
such a system would have a legitimate organizational role. In fact, this effort 
eventually collided with a lack of managerial support. Yet, their persistence strikes us 
as significant. Accordingly, we use it as an entry point for appraising the potentials of 
the conventional critiques of management, standardization, and development. 
It might be argued that the team had simply internalized the logic of the audit 
paradigm. After all, even as they craved self-reflection and learning, the interpretive 
frame remained monitoring and evaluation. Spun into the audit universe of discourse, 
they were only able to conceive of organizational improvement in terms of yet more 
technical fixes. According to this narrative, the team’s interest in re-inventing the 
standard illustrates an invisible, yet fundamentally repressive relation (e.g. Knights 
and Wilmott 1989).  
This story line exemplifies the ‘anti-performative’ critique of instrumental 
reason. Monitoring and evaluation is seen as performing its own universe of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See	  Winthereik	  (2003)	  on	  local	  experimentation	  with	  standardization	  in	  health	  care	  settings.	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operation. Accordingly, the system as a whole can hardly avoid closing in on itself, 
becoming blind to its own blind spots. As the performative effects of evaluation 
become invisible, the paradigm itself becomes increasingly invulnerable. Thus, any 
problem will simply lead to more calls for more comprehensive evaluation.  
If we consider our ethnographic material, however, nothing indicates that 
monitoring and evaluation was strictly closed, not to mention invulnerable. For one 
thing, it was not the power of standards that frustrated our informants, but rather their 
mixture of hubris and irrelevance. What prompted their attempts to do evaluation 
differently was the inability of the existing standard to do much of anything. 
Furthermore, team members certainly did not uncritically accept audit demands. But 
the problems with these demands were not that they were repressive but rather that 
they were uninteresting or irrelevant. 
It is thus difficult to maintain that the employees of NatureAid were either 
subjugated by, or entirely ignorant with respect to, the evaluation paradigm. In fact, 
team members were very knowledgeable about the inability of standards to capture 
complex realities, and they knew well that standards are only able to make visible 
what they have been designed to ‘perceive.’ Rather than a clean distinction between 
managers who govern by numbers and resistant employees, we are witness to a 
situation characterized by different, and only partly related, performances of 
optimization.  
The international standard found no practical use in Nature Aid’s Danish 
office because it was too detailed. Our informants wondered about the purpose of a 
standard so expansive that it allowed for no delimitation of context. Conversely, when 
they sought to re-invent their own standard, it was because they were looking for 
ways of knowing their practice differently. While they had no interest in 
encompassing forms of standardization that aimed to make everything subject to 
evaluation, they were very keen on achieving specific forms of complexity reduction 
by slicing reality into more relevant bits. 
Here, the question of monitoring and evaluation connects with that of power. 
After all, the interest in making a local standard can easily be seen as an attempt by 
team members to wrest some control from their managers. Yet, since the new 
standard would also reduce complex realities, it might be a way for the team members 
to strengthen their control over external partners. Exemplifying the post-development 
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critique, the re-invented standard would thus exhibit the same information politics as 
the one various funders applied against team members, just on a smaller scale.  
However, our ethnography does not show much supporting evidence for this 
interpretation either. Indeed, one of the recurrent complaints about the existing 
standards was their excessive emphasis on control rather than partnership and 
adaptive management. Further, the discussions about the alternative standard revolved 
neither around a withdrawal from existing power relations nor around the need for 
tightening the grip on partners. 
 While we are certainly not obliged to share our informants’ faith in the ability 
of the new standard to create an open, reflexive space of learning, we are required to 
grapple with their experimental effort to create such a space. This is why we engage 
neither in an “anti-performative” critique of instrumental reason, nor in a “critically 
performative” effort to radically question existing organizational discourses, or in yet 
another critique of development hegemony.  
While there is little doubt that our informants ’subjected’ themselves 
(Foucault 1991) -- both to concrete standards and to more abstract ideals of 
standardization  -- much hinges on what we take those terms to mean. Clearly, team 
members did not simply bow to the demands of standards. However, they were 
subjected in quite a different sense. They actively submitted to the demands of the 
new standard, by conferring to it the power to delimit the scope of their work. They 
did so in the hope that such subjection might open up new possibilities for action 
(Gomart and Hennion 1999). 
 
Good Standards Constrain Reality 
What makes a standard for evaluation good? Based on our ethnography, it appears 
that a good standard should not seek to exercise more control over organizational 
routines. Nor should it seek encapsulate all dimensions of development projects. After 
all, the entry point for remaking the standard was that the evaluation wheel, while 
claiming to be comprehensive, failed to grasp much of what mattered in practice. 
Given these experiences, the good evaluation standard should be tailored to support a 
different sets of goals and capable of capturing specific bits of development work 
differently. At issue would not be a competition among standards, but simply co-
existence (which, of course, can take many forms).  
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 As this also makes clear, a good standard does not try to represent the world in 
its complexity. Quite to the contrary its point is to prune reality, like a gardener 
prunes a wildly growing bush. A good standard needs to make present just the kinds 
of things team members care about while temporarily removing what is irrelevant, 
such as the obviously different contexts of projects dealing with sustainable logging 
in East Africa or shrimp farms in the Greater Mekong. This is why the hope team 
members had for the new standard can be described with Emilie Gomart’s (2004) 
notion of ‘generous constraints.’ Our informants were quite willing to submit to 
standards if their constraints were generous, for they were looking for constraints that 
would make it possible to learn together and be subjected to relevant forms of 
collegial scrutiny.  
This suggests that conventional critiques directed against the reductions of 
standards move too quickly. The notion that reduction is inherently negative misses 
the central point that particular reductions are the explicit and, indeed, often reflexive 
purpose of standards. Rather than lamenting the reduction of complexity, we are 
directed towards exploration of the specific constraints standards put in place.   
 It no longer surprises management theorists, sociologists, or anthropologists 
that formal systems and standards entail de-contextualization. Everyone knows that 
local interpretations and patterns of action, underhanded political negotiations and 
invisible economical incentives disappear when translated into the factual language of 
monitoring and evaluation. However NatureAid team members are as aware of this as 
academic critics. They know very well that what is demanded of standards – demands 
like ensuring coherence in projects spanning donors in Copenhagen and villages in 
Malawi or Vietnam -- is very difficult, if not totally unachievable, since the contexts 
are almost incommensurable (Rottenburg 2009). But this is the starting point of their 
experiment in optimization. It is because the team cares as much as critical social 
scientists about the varied, uncontrollable effects of standards, or even more, since 
their job and their passion depend on them, that they invest time in imagining new 
forms of evaluation.  
 
Reductions and Additions 
There is no general difference between “anti-performative” positions that aim to resist 
instrumental reason and “critically performative” ones that aim to subvert practices 
from within. Critical theories of management, too, operate performatively, as part of 
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reality. Even as they denounce the reductions of management discourse, instrumental 
reason, standards or optimization, they are also reducing reality in their own ways. 
Having access to no all-seeing, non-reductive, meta-position, critics are part of the 
same game as the managers and organizations they write about. Thus, critique loses 
its epistemic privilege, without gaining any specific performative efficacy.  
Yet even as critical analyses and audit tools both reduce the world they also 
both add to it. New standards and indicators do new things to organizations, just as 
new research may change academic discussions. Hence, it becomes possible in both 
cases to query the relevance and generosity of the constraints and reductions imposed, 
with a view to understanding their additive effects. In this post-critical landscape, 
critique thus gives way to experimental engagements with particular bits of the world 
they would like to understand, or see changed. 
 From this vantage point, the problem with managerial efforts to monitor and 
evaluate their employees and projects, even in their informal or otherwise ‘soft’ 
dimensions, is not that they reduce lived experience or organizational complexity to 
an image of instrumental reason. Rather, the problem has to do with the particular 
way in which audit adds to organizational reality. Drawing on Marilyn Strathern 
(2000a), this addition can be characterized as self-propelling. 
Once audit information has been produced, it begins to generate calls for 
action. Moreover, irrespective of the organizational “value” (however measured) of 
audit information, it tends to be very difficult to get rid of. For Strathern (2000b), 
these interrelated characteristics constitute the tyranny of transparency. We can see 
the re-invention of the NatureAid standard as an experimental attempt to ward off, or 
at least minimize, this tyranny.  
 However, a residual problem remains with this diagnosis. As other critical 
discussions of audit, it presents transparency as a homogeneous phenomenon. Yet, as 
we have seen, even within the limited organization and professional domain of 
NatureAid, transparency is a variable phenomenon. It is understood differently, and it 
is embedded within different practices and standards. When critics speak of 
transparency as a homogeneous form, they are overlooking the multiplicity of its 
empirical forms. Further, while any effort to create transparency involves the 
imposition of a particular kind of order on the world, it simultaneously generates its 
own ‘other’ -- constituted by everything not rendered transparent. Thus, 
transparencies produced by KPIs or by the evaluation wheel are different from those 
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imagined or produced by the homemade standard. Rathefr than transparency in the 
singular, there are many relative transparencies.  
Even within NatureAid’s Danish office, optimization is variably enacted, 
shaped by diverse, competing visions, motivations, strategies and standards. When 
different forms of optimization and transparency bump into one another, they may 
give rise to frustrations, controversies and critique. They may create dents in the 
relations between branch offices and international headquarters. What appears like an 
obvious strategy for creating organizational transparency from one position may seem 
opaque or even incomprehensible from another.   
 
Learning from Experiments in Optimization 
The organizational discussions about how to best monitor and evaluate development 
work in NatureAid offer a platform for considering the analytical purchase of critical 
perspectives on audit and optimization. Whereas such perspectives draw the 
conclusion that standards reduce complex realities to instrumental reason, we have 
argued that this distinction itself breaks down, both in practice and in theory.  
In ‘The Critiques of Utility,’ the literary scholar Barbara Herrnstein Smith 
vividly describes the basic dualist assumption informing critical social science: 
 
the force of the opposition/segregation of the discourses of value is most 
evident, perhaps, in the recurrent struggles between two kinds of calculation or 
cost-benefit analysis: on the one hand, the kind, so named, that frames its 
objective as the efficient arrival at a specific and readily identifiable 
…”bottom-line” and, accordingly, ignores or downplays less readily 
measurable and less comparable costs, risks and benefits…and, on the other 
hand, and typically in antagonistic relation to the first kind, another 
calculation, not named as such, that characteristically foregrounds and 
promotes exactly what was ignored by the first (Smith 1988, 133, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Critical management studies, as well as sociological critiques of standardization and 
anthropological critiques of development, are all situated within, and contributing to, 
Smith’s second discourse of value, the ‘other calculation.’ Focusing on the ‘subtle, 
diffuse…and heterogeneous’ (Smith 1988, 133) aspects of social and organizational 
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life, these studies take audit and standardization in general to task for reducing just 
these complex dimensions.    
Describing both discourses as calculative, however, Smith emphasized that 
‘the categories and considerations with which they deal and the operations they 
perform are only relatively and locally distinguishable from one another’ (Smith 
1988, 133). As we have indicated, monitoring and evaluation at NatureAid embeds 
different calculations of value (Helgesson and Muniesa 2013) that are also only 
relatively and locally distinguishable. 
This observation continues to hold once we move from the empirical setting to 
that of academic analysis. For the difference between development consultants and 
social scientists, or between ‘field’ and ‘desk,’ is itself less clear-cut than critical 
scholars may like to imagine.  
Thus, Marilyn Strathern notes that  
 
The auditor or assessor … is little different from the anthropologist translating 
across cultures. The anthropologist’s analytical categories (social structure, 
cultural values, modes of organisation) turn one kind of description (e.g. 
peoples’ perceptions of themselves) into another and thereby conceal certain 
truths in revealing others (Strathern 2000b, 70) 
 
More starkly, Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard’s (1997, 26) observed that social 
scientific concerns ‘with context and complexity is neither more nor less separable 
from a self-serving professionalism than the development practitioner’s concern with 
the replicability of project design.’ While critical management theorists and 
anthropologists have their eyes trained on the ‘self-serving’ reductions of consultants 
and development professionals, Cooper and Packard’s point is that their own 
emphasis on context and complexity is equally subservient to the academic networks 
and discourses of which the critics are part.  
 Cooper or Packard are not, of course, arguing for the irrelevance of context 
and complexity. They are simply noting that, being ‘neither more nor less separable’ 
from their contexts than the positions and practices of development consultants, 
academic diagnoses are never made from an elevated meta-position. Instead, they are 
also performative elements that operate within specific networks. Accordingly, the 
critical perspectives of management scholars are not inherently superior to those of 
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their informants – for example those of NatureAid professionals. Yet, given these 
professionals were in fact trying to take simultaneous account of ‘complexity and 
replication,’ we have suggested that organizational researchers might learn something 
from their experimental attempts. 
 As part of their efforts to create and maintain relations with partners as diverse 
as Danida and villagers in partner countries, NatureAid team members wondered 
about how to relevantly optimize their own practices. They constantly tried to 
improve things. They attempted to adjust formal evaluations to make them just a bit 
more useful. They tested new modes of collaborating with their partners (Jensen and 
Winthereik 2015). And, as we have described, they experimented with developing a 
standard that would impose generous constraints.  
Team members did all these things not because they were blinded by audit, or 
were subjugated by it, but rather because they were all too aware of the world’s 
complexity. They urgently needed to delimit this complexity, or their projects would 
collapse as quickly as a house of cards in the wind.	  	  
Here we can make a distinction between optimization as a normative demand 
and as an experimental disposition. While optimization of organizational 
performance, including self-management, was obviously operative in NatureAid as a 
normative demand, the practical achievements of the organization nevertheless 
crucially depended on employees’ concrete experiments with optimization.  
When team members collaborate with new partners, the situation is inherently 
experimental, since they cannot know in advance what is the best course of action. 
Indeed, they are often quite unsure of whether and how their precarious interactions 
with people they do not know well may lead to successful projects. Invariably, these 
optimization efforts thus entail the risk of navigating into unknown waters. The risk is 
real, for projects can easily go awry, and foreign agendas can translate the aspirations 
of the employees beyond recognition. This is why experimental optimization efforts 
are directly tied together with the idealist passion for ‘saving the world’ that forms a 
backdrop to work in NatureAid. 
Focusing on experiments in optimization within NatureAid has facilitated a re-
description of audit as a varied set of practices and aspirations, embedded in standards 
that generate relative transparencies. Elucidating the gaps and mutual opacities 
between forms of monitoring and evaluation, we have further emphasized that 
management itself is heterogeneous. Rather than a dichotomy between controlling 
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managers guided by instrumental reason and resistant professionals aiming to elude 
control, both groups are involved in optimizing efforts. These efforts, however, 
deploy different standards, and have somewhat different (but not totally incompatible) 
aims.  
Our study thus exemplifies one way in which management has ‘broken up.’ 
The point is neither that management shows signs up breaking down, nor that it 
threatens to collapse under the onslaught of critique. Rather, management in 
NatureAid appears ‘broken up,’ in that it is a distributed, ambient activity, variably 
performed by different actors who use a cohort of standards and audit tools. This 
fragmentation suggests that management in practice does not depend on the kind of 
closed, bulletproof system beloved as a target of critique by critical management 
studies. To the contrary, it is because organizational members recognize that the 
system is potholed, full of gaps, inconsistencies, and indeterminacies that they engage 
in experiments in optimization. Their work can be seen as a practical, experimental 
version of what Barbara Herrnstein Smith (1988) called ‘alternative perspectives for 
critical theory.’ 
Here, we have therefore tried to create some analytical elbowroom for 
learning from our informants’ alternative perspectives what constitutes good forms of 
optimization. In our view, management and organizational researchers would do well 
to heed their experimental disposition. 
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